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Scholarly defenses of abortion continue to be produced, and so defenders of the 
right to live of all human beings, born and unborn, are never in want of a subject. In 
his article “A Present Like Ours,” Michael Davis’s challenges are not only to Don 
Marquis’s future-like-ours critique of abortion but also to abortion critiques from 
the (new and classic) natural law perspective based on the person as an individual 
substance of rational nature.1 Davis writes, “Marquis’s theory treats the rights of 
adult women as counting no more than those of a fetus no more complicated than an 
ameba. Even many people who oppose abortion will recognize that as discriminating 
against women.”2
In fact, the pro-life view does not treat the rights of adult women as counting no 
more than those of a fetus no more complicated than an amoeba. Women (and men) 
have numerous rights, both legally and morally, that are not enjoyed by a prenatal 
human being. They can drive, vote, run for public office, and within the parameters 
of the law and sound ethics, govern their own lives in ways that no minor child may. 
The pro-life view is not that women and unborn human beings have equal rights in 
every respect, but that all human beings, born and unborn, male and female, mature 
and immature, share in the same basic rights, including the right to life. To treat all 
human beings as fundamentally equal in basic dignity is to avoid unjust discrimina-
tion by acknowledging that all women, all children, and all men are created equal 
and endowed with basic rights. Indeed, it is discrimination to treat some human 
beings—those who are not like us in terms of race, religion, or birth—as lacking 
basic rights. So it is not defenders of prenatal human beings but defenders of abortion 
who are acting to reinforce discrimination. 
1. Michael Davis, “A Present Like Ours: A Refutation of Marquis’s Argument against 
Abortion and a Sketch of a General Theory of Personhood,” International Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 27.1 (Spring 2013): 88, doi: 10.5840/ijap20132718.
2. Ibid.
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But the claim that all human beings have equal rights itself causes other  problems 
on Davis’s view: 
There are few, if any, places in the world today, or at any other time, where the 
criminal law would treat as a murderer the woman who deliberately obtained 
an early abortion. Even where abortion has been prohibited, the law has gen-
erally treated the fetus, even a relatively mature fetus, as something less than 
“one of us.” Marquis’s theory proves more than it should. Marquis owes us an 
explanation of why abortion, even early in pregnancy, is not simple murder, 
deserving death or at least long imprisonment; or, if Marquis actually thinks 
it is murder, he should say so openly, accepting that as a conclusion against 
common sense.3
What Davis is saying is that if pro-life advocates really believe that a prental human 
being has a right to life, then they should advocate for laws that make abortion not 
just a crime but a crime equal to first-degree murder. 
If all human beings share in equal basic rights, does it follow that abortion 
must be treated by criminal law as first-degree murder? Should women who get 
abortions get the death penalty, be imprisoned for life, or at least be subjected to the 
same punishment as other people who intentionally kill innocent human beings? Is 
Marquis, and are other defenders of the equal rights of prenatal human beings, fun-
damentally inconsistent in not making this demand? Or are pro-life people lacking 
in forthrightness because they think women who get abortions should be treated as 
murderers, but they lack the courage to state this publically?
Inconsistency or timidity are not the only alternatives. To defend the basic 
equal rights of all human beings does not necessarily mean that abortion should be 
punished as first-degree murder. Abortion and the murder of an adult are alike in that 
both involve the intentional killing of an innocent person. But there are important 
differences between an abortion and a typical case of murder. The first difference 
has to do with culpability in terms of knowledge and in terms of voluntariness. If I 
kill my auto mechanic, it is implausible in the extreme for me to try to excuse my act 
by claiming that I did not realize that he was an innocent human being. By contrast, 
in many (maybe even most) cases of abortion, the woman obtaining the abortion 
does not believe that her authorization is terminating the life of an innocent human 
being. It could be that this ignorance is culpable or that this ignorance is inculpable, 
but ignorance of the identity of the victim is almost never involved in typical cases 
of murder. 
Secondly, the voluntariness of the act is often mitigated by great fear or anxiety 
on the part of the woman. When mothers kill their own newborns, as sometimes 
happens, it is not unusual for the punishment due for killing an innocent person to 
be mitigated in light of subjective factors that led to the killing, such as postpartum 
depression. By similar reasoning, mothers who authorize an abortion are often moti-
vated by intense fear, which reduces the voluntariness of the act. In many cases of 
abortion, again unlike typical cases of murder, duress is involved, in which the father 
3. Ibid.
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of the child, and sometimes others, pressure the woman into getting an abortion that 
she would have never gotten had the news of the pregnancy been greeted with joy. 
Third, the victim of abortion—although fundamentally equal—is not equal in 
all respects to the victim in a typical murder. In a typical murder, the victim’s death 
negatively affects the victim’s relatives and friends. The victim can no longer carry 
out his or her responsibilities at work or at home. The killing involved in murder 
may also make other people fear for their lives. The typical murder also brings a 
loss for all those who contributed to the life of the one who is killed—such as the 
parents, caregivers, and teachers who helped the victim gain maturity. Finally, the 
typical murder thwarts the life-plans of the victim, whose dreams, ambitions, and 
plans are demolished by death. 
These characteristics, typical of a case of murder, are not present in an abor-
tion. A prenatal human being does not have friends, and relatives may not even know 
of his or her existence. Human beings who find out about someone else’s abortion 
do not fear for their own lives, since abortions kill only prenatal human beings. An 
unborn child does not have responsibilities at work or home on which others depend. 
Only one person—the pregnant woman—has contributed to the maturation of the 
fetus, and this is the person who is authorizing the abortion. Moreover, the prenatal 
human being does not yet have plans, ambitions, and dreams that are thwarted by 
getting killed. So although the killing involved in abortion and the killing involved 
in a typical murder are the same in the most important fundamental sense—an 
innocent person’s life is extinguished—in many other ways, they are not the same. 
It makes sense, therefore, for the law to take these many differences into account 
when determining the punishment appropriate for abortion and appropriate for typical 
murder. These differences also answer the question of why it makes sense to rescue 
one five-year-old girl rather than ten frozen human embryos.
By similar reasoning, the assassination of the president of the United States 
should be treated more severely by law than the murder of a regular citizen, in virtue 
of the president’s role in society and the fact that the president’s death adversely affects 
not just immediate family members and friends but potentially the entire world. So, 
too, the murder of a regular person should be treated more severely by law than the 
intentional killing of a human being prior to birth. Yet making such differentiations 
is consistent with holding that, in terms of basic human dignity, the president, the 
regular citizen, and the human fetus have equal basic rights. It is not inconsistent for 
a defender of prenatal human beings to advocate lesser penalties for abortion than 
for the murder of postnatal human beings. 
Moreover, prudential considerations of the enforceability of the law suggest that 
the penalties for violating laws forbidding abortion should fall on abortionists rather 
than on women getting abortions. Mitigating factors typically reduce the culpability 
of women seeking abortions. Abortionists ending the lives of prenatal human beings 
typically perform their tasks as part of a regular routine, without mitigating factors. 
If women were also subject to criminal penalties, it would make the prosecution of 
abortions much more difficult, since women would be implicating themselves in 
criminal activity by testifying against the abortionists. Moreover, abortionists typi-
cally kill many prenatal human beings, whereas an individual woman rarely has as 
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many abortions. With laws against illegal drugs, the law should focus on the drug 
dealers who profit from endangering others rather than on the drug users who often 
suffer from their use. Similarly, laws against abortion should focus on abortionists 
who profit from killing rather than women who often suffer from abortions.
In another critique, Robert Lovering’s “The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2)” 
casts the pro-life view as resting on “the basic potential for rational moral agency” 
of the prenatal human being.4 But the pro-life view in its standard articulations by 
Robert George, Francis Beckwith, Patrick Lee, and many others including myself 
does not rest on the claim that every human being prior to birth has the basic poten-
tial for rational moral agency, but rather that every human being (born and unborn) 
actually (not just potentially) possesses a rational nature.5 What is the difference? 
A basic potential for rational agency may not be present in some human beings, 
such as those who have a serious mental handicap. Yet such human beings deserve 
fundamental protection against exploitation and against being intentionally killed. 
Having misrepresented the pro-life position, Lovering then points out that “it’s 
very difficult to see how this unactualizable potential could confer moral standing. 
For all practical purposes, there is no difference between possessing this unactualiz-
able potential and not possessing it at all. Given this, it’s very difficult to see how 
there could be a moral difference between possessing this unactualizable potential 
and not possessing it at all.”6 The difficulty only arises because the rational nature 
of a being is confused with its potential for rational agency.
But perhaps this response only pushes the dispute to a different level. Why 
should we say that a particular being has a rational nature, if in fact this being has 
no potential to perform rational activities? This question might be clarified in the 
course of considering another objection to the substance view. 
Lovering notes that if we hold that human beings prior to birth have a basic 
potential for rational moral agency because most or many of them will develop to 
the point where they possess either proximate or immediately exercisable rational 
agency, then a problem arises. Because an estimated 60 percent of pregnancies end 
in spontaneous miscarriage, only 40 percent of prenatal human beings will ever 
exercise rational agency. If we hold that 40 percent or even a much lower percentage 
of successful development of rational agency is sufficient for granting moral status 
to the entire group, then we are acting arbitrarily and moving closer to the view that 
rational agency is relevant.7 
4. Rob Lovering, “The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2),” Bioethics 28.7 (Sep-
tember 2014): 378.
5. See, for example, Christopher Kaczor, The Ethics of Abortion: Human Life, Women’s 
Rights, and the Question of Justice, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2015); Francis Beckwith, 
Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case against Abortion Choice (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen, Embryo: A Defense 
of Human Life, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Witherspoon Institute, 2011); and Patrick Lee, Abortion 
and Unborn Human Life (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010).
6. Lovering, “Substance View (2),” 381, original emphasis.
7. Ibid.
noTes & AbsTrAcTs  kAczor
173
Even assuming the highly debatable claim that 60 percent of pregnancies 
spontaneously miscarry, this argument is problematic. To examine this objection, 
let’s consider what it is to be a mammal. Part of what distinguishes mammals is 
their ability to nurse their young. So human beings, dogs, and zebras are mammals; 
iguanas, tapeworms, and wasps are not mammals. Not so fast, replies the critic. Do 
you not realize that some human beings, dogs, and zebras do not nurse their young, 
even cannot nurse their young? Male mammals of all these species cannot nurse 
their young, females before puberty cannot nurse their young, and elderly females 
cannot nurse their young. There are even cases of females of reproductive age who 
cannot nurse their young. The percentage of human beings, dogs, and zebras who 
are capable of nursing their young is, therefore, well below 40 percent. So are we 
mistaken in claiming that all human beings are mammals? 
Of course not. In fact, all human beings, dogs, and zebras are mammals, not just 
females of those species and not just females of reproductive age, because all these 
creatures belongs to the kind of species that nurses its young. So, too, there is nothing 
arbitrary about including prenatal human beings in the category of rational animals. 
In his Scholastic Metaphysics (required reading for anyone interested in the 
intersection of classic Thomistic metaphysics and analytic philosophy), Edward Feser 
clarifies what is at issue: “The distinction between essence and properties makes sense 
of the distinction between normal and defective instances. . . . Given its essence, a cat 
has four legs, but this property might not manifest itself in a particular cat if the cat 
is genetically or otherwise damaged. . . . Its lack of four legs just makes it a defective 
cat, and precisely because four-leggedness is one of its properties.”8 Feser goes on 
to point out that all human beings are rational animals, even if some human beings 
because of genetic malfunction, brain injury, or immaturity do not engage in ratio-
nal activity. Indeed, we identify this human being as immature, or brain damaged, 
or genetically malformed because we have already properly categorized them as a 
rational animal. The defect points to the non-defective; immaturity is understood by 
reference to maturity. 
Now consider another objection to the substance view offered by Lovering. 
Imagine that scientists discover a rational agency serum that can boost the intelli-
gence of chimpanzees so they are like the apes in Planet of the Apes. These chimps 
would clearly be persons with rights to live. “Now, clearly, the ultimate potential for 
rational moral agency in their case would be an accidental property,” writes Lovering, 
who concludes that therefore, “it’s not the case, then, that an entity’s moral stand-
ing must be a function of its essential properties.”9 An entity’s moral standing, as in 
the case of these apes, can rest on accidental properties.
This objection rests on the assertion that the apes in the sci-fi example have 
acquired their standing as rational agents because of an accidental quality. There is an 
alternative explanation of the case. That some apes were injected with the rationality 
8. Edward Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Neunkirchen-
Seelscheid, Germany: Editiones Scholasticae, 2015), 233.
9. Lovering, “Substance View (2),” 383, original emphasis.
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serum may be accidental in some senses. For example, maybe, much like penicillin, 
the rational agency serum was found by accident rather than a deliberate plan to create 
rational agents. The property in question could also be accidental in that these apes 
rather than other apes were injected. Perhaps the scientists injected whichever apes 
happened to be on one side of the cage, or perhaps they injected a particular ape if a 
flipped quarter landed heads but not if it landed tails. The apes may be have an acci-
dental property in these senses, but in another sense the property in question cannot 
be accidental. The rationality serum causes not an accidental but rather a substantial 
change in the ape. The ape, in virtue of gaining radically new abilities, becomes a 
radically different kind of creature with a radically different moral status. Just as an 
injection that kills an ape brings about substantial change in the ape from living to 
deceased, so too the rational agency serum brings about a substantial change in the 
ape from being a nonrational agent to a rational agent. 
Lovering also raises a dilemma against the substance view. Do dolphins, apes, 
and whales have intrinsic value or extrinsic value? He writes, “By ‘intrinsic’ value I 
mean value it’s logically possible for something to have even if it were the only thing 
that existed.”10 So intrinsic value is a value that it’s logically possible for something to 
have even if it is the only thing that exists. If there were only one person, that person 
would have intrinsic value. But if there were only one toothbrush, that toothbrush 
would not have intrinsic value, and it would only gain extrinsic value because people 
like to have clean teeth. Intrinsic value does not come in degree: a being either has 
it or does not have it. Extrinsic value, again by contrast, may come in degrees (the 
toothbrush is more or less useful). If intrinsic value does not come in degrees, then 
dolphins, apes, whales, and other intelligent animals either have moral status just 
like us (which advocates of the substance view reject) or have no intrinsic value at 
all (which is counter-intuitive, “given their similarities to beings with the ultimate 
potential for rational moral agency”).11 On the other hand, if such creatures are to 
have only extrinsic value, then they have the same moral status as tools, which also 
seems counter-intuitive because almost everyone condemns animal cruelty. 
If nonrational animals do not have equal moral status with human beings, does 
it follow that they are mere tools with which human agents can do anything they 
please? This conclusion does not follow. Let’s say that someone legally obtained 
Michelangelo’s Pieta and decided to destroy it for no good reason. Is this action 
ethically problematic? Yes, you might say, because it deprives innumerable people 
of the chance to see this beautiful sculpture. So let’s say the owner of the Pieta was 
the last man in the world: could he destroy it then for no good reason? The Pieta 
is, after all, a mere piece of marble and so lacks intrinsic value. True, but the man 
who destroyed it would be acting badly in as much as it is against reason to destroy 
something of spectacular beauty without sufficient reason. A reasonable response 
to a thing of beauty is to contemplate and cherish it, not destroy it. Acting against 
reason, as St. Thomas Aquinas argues, is ethically wrong.12 
10. Ibid., 378 note 2.
11. Ibid., 384.
12. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II.94.3 ad 2.
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On the other hand, if the man had to break apart the Pieta to make a barricade 
so that wild animals wouldn’t eat him, he would be justified in destroying the statue. 
In a similar way, a reasonable response to suffering is to alleviate it. Just as beauty 
is something in general to be contemplated, suffering is something in general to 
be avoided. It is unreasonable to inflict pain on a sentient being without sufficient 
justification. To delight in inflicting pain is irrational. So unless a person has a suf-
ficient justification for inflicting pain on an animal, an agent is unjustified in doing 
so. Animal cruelty is therefore wrong, but we don’t need to assume that animals 
have rights (any more than statues have rights) in order to come to this judgment.13
These recent attempts to justify abortion provide no sound reason to abandon 
the principle that all human beings, including those waiting to be born, should be 
welcomed in life and protected by law.
chrisTopher kAczor
13. Germain Grisez offers other reasons against animal cruelty that do not presuppose 
that animals have moral status; see The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol. 2, Living a Christian Life, 
ch. 10, question C, http://www.twotlj.org/G-2-10-C.html.
